The only thing I ever withheld from the KGB were the names of two agents whom I personally had known and handled and had a particular feeling for.
The human spy, in terms of the American espionage effort, had never been terribly pertinent.
No one's interested really in knowing what policies or diplomatic initiatives or arms negotiations might have been compromised by me.
My little scam in April '85 went like this Give me 50,000 here's some names of some people we've recruited.
In my professional work with the Agency, by the late '70s, I had come to question the value of a great deal of what we were doing, in terms of the intelligence agency's impact on American policy.
I'm a traitor, but I don't consider myself a traitor.
I saw a limit to what I was giving as kind of a scam I was running on the KGB, by giving them people that I knew were their double agents fed to us.
I could have stopped it after they paid me the 50,000. I wouldn't even have had to go on to do more than I already had just the double agents' names that I gave.
Historians don't really like to carry on speculative debates, but you could certainly argue that the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe was extremely, extremely low.
By the late '70s I had come to question the point of a great deal of what we were doing, in terms of the CIA's overall charter.
The resistance of policy-makers to intelligence is not just founded on an ideological presupposition. They distrust intelligence sources and intelligence officials because they don't understand what the real problems are.
The difficulties of conducting espionage against the Soviet Union in the Soviet Union were such that historically the Agency had backed away from the task.
Perhaps my information hurt the Soviet Union more than it helped. I have no idea. It was not something I ever discussed with the KGB officers that I was dealing with.
Our Soviet espionage efforts had virtually never, or had very seldom, produced any worthwhile political or economic intelligence on the Soviet Union.
I handed over names and compromised so many CIA agents in the Soviet Union.
I found that our Soviet espionage efforts had virtually never, or had very seldom, produced any worthwhile political or economic intelligence on the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union did not achieve victory over the West, so was my information inadequate to help them to victory, or did it play no particular role in their failure to achieve victory
Foreign Ministry guys don't become agents. Party officials, the Foreign Ministry nerds, tend not to volunteer to Western intelligence agencies.
There are so many things a large intelligence espionage organization can do to justify its existence, that people can get promotions for, because it could result in results.
I knew quite well, when I gave the names of our agents in the Soviet Union, that I was exposing them to the full machinery of counterespionage and the law, and then prosecution and capital punishment.
The U.S. is, so far as I know, the only nation which places such extensive reliance on the polygraph. It has gotten us into a lot of trouble.
The national security state has many unfair and cruel weapons in its arsenal, but that of junk science is one which can be fought and perhaps defeated.
The FBI, to its credit in a self-serving sort of way, rejects the routine use of the polygraph on its own people.
Deciding whether to trust or credit a person is always an uncertain task.
I said in court a long time ago that I didn't see that the Soviet Union was significantly helped by the information I gave them, nor that the United States was significantly harmed.
Picture Quotes to Inspire and Delight
Picture Quotes to Inspire and Delight